Ideas & History · Innovation, knowledge and public power
Rasigan Maharajh and the struggle over what innovation is for
Prof Rasigan Maharajh’s work puts a demanding question to technological progress: does it expand people’s capacity to shape development, or strengthen the relations that keep them dependent?
A country can acquire sophisticated machinery and remain dependent on decisions made elsewhere. Imagine a publicly funded installation whose operators can run it but cannot repair it, inspect its software or adapt its design. The equipment works. The contract may even look economical. Yet the people paying for it possess little authority over its future. This is a thought experiment about development: what, beyond a functioning product, must a society gain from technological change?
Prof Rasigan Maharajh’s 2011 doctoral study, Innovating beyond Racial Capitalism, gives that question a historical foundation. It examines South Africa’s adoption of the national system of innovation approach against the longer development of its political economy. Its concern is whether new science and technology institutions can transform inherited relations of production, or become more capable instruments for reproducing them. The distinction places the purpose of innovation, and the distribution of its benefits, inside the analysis of technical performance. [1]
The challenge is demanding because technical competence and social emancipation can diverge. A successful innovation might lower a firm’s costs while leaving workers with less security or communities with less control. Conversely, an intervention can carry admirable promises while failing to deliver a reliable service. An adequate public standard has to judge both the practical achievement and the social relationship it establishes.
Access, learning and authority
In their 2010 chapter Innovation Strategies in Developing Countries, Maharajh and Erika Kraemer-Mbula treat innovation as an interactive process shaped by institutions and local conditions. They include learning in informal businesses and established sectors, rather than reserving innovation for laboratories or frontier inventions. Importing technology is insufficient: acquiring its tacit elements, adapting it and improving it require deliberate domestic effort. External knowledge can complement local capability without replacing the work of building that capability. [5]
The authors also resist a simple choice between international comparison and national particularity. Comparative evidence can inform policy, but a strategy cannot be copied wholesale into different circumstances. They call for policy experimentation, monitoring and learning, with autonomy joined to accountability. Their concern extends to the people who administer programmes: capable institutions require skills in implementation and management as well as scientific expertise. [5]
Return to the imagined installation. Three gains now need separate assessment. Access means a service becomes available. Learning means people develop the competence to sustain and alter it. Authority means they can influence its purpose and terms. A procurement programme could improve the first while obstructing the other two. A training programme could develop competence without giving its graduates any say over investment. These distinctions are useful precisely because a single label, technology transfer, can conceal such different outcomes.
None requires a country to reproduce every component domestically. Specialisation and international cooperation can be sensible. The test is whether a partnership enlarges the range of choices available to its participants over time. A contract that includes maintenance training but prevents independent repair would offer a narrow form of learning. A shared research programme with accessible methods and durable institutional support could offer something more. The details of ownership and cooperation matter more than the nationality printed on the equipment.
What changed after apartheid?
South Africa’s 2019 White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation describes the 1996 policy as an effort to redirect an exclusive inherited system towards shared social and economic objectives. Looking back over 1996–2016, it records institution building, a larger research system and increased participation by black people and women. It also acknowledges persistent inequalities at senior levels, fragmented programmes and an innovation system whose potential had not translated fully into social benefit. These are the government’s retrospective assessments, rather than measurements of conditions today. [6]
Maharajh’s thesis supplies a sharper interpretation of the problem. Its historical method relates policy and institutional change to successive economic strategies. In its conclusion, he warns that performance targets and international benchmarks can narrow the innovation framework, while established business and academic interests can appropriate its progressive language. He retains a role for the framework, provided it is located within a wider critique of political economy. Better coordination is therefore open to competing political purposes. [1]
This is not a licence to treat every scientific gain as worthless because inequality persists. New capabilities can matter profoundly even within an unequal society. Nor does the coexistence of innovation and exclusion, by itself, establish that a particular programme caused the exclusion. A serious assessment has to identify the channels: who receives research support, whose problems become fundable, how procurement distributes opportunities, and whether publicly supported learning survives beyond a contract. Structural criticism becomes stronger when it can explain those connections.
The 2019 White Paper itself proposes broader participation, stronger policy learning and support for social and grassroots innovation. It identifies the concentration of innovation support in metropolitan areas and seeks a wider spatial reach. Those commitments demonstrate that the policy vocabulary already contains more than commercial competitiveness. They establish objectives against which implementation can be examined; their appearance in a policy document does not establish their fulfilment. [6]
The disagreement is consequently not exhausted by whether a policy mentions inclusion. The harder issue is which interests can determine what inclusion means. A programme could admit more entrepreneurs while leaving the allocation of investment untouched. It could consult workers after deciding to replace their jobs. Participation becomes materially different when those affected can influence the question before the technical answer has been purchased.
Ecology belongs inside the development question
Maharajh’s 2025 chapter on ecological challenges places innovation within interacting economic, social and environmental crises. Its argument rejects the treatment of ecological damage as a secondary consideration to be addressed after growth. It connects unequal development to the allocation of knowledge and productive capacity, and challenges the idea that access to technology and skills can, on its own, resolve poverty. This is a political argument about the organisation of development, not a rejection of scientific knowledge. [7]
The chapter’s conclusion gives that argument an institutional direction. Maharajh calls for organised labour and social movements, alongside scientific and technological workers, to participate in governing research and development investment. He links the recovery of suppressed indigenous knowledge to a wider knowledge commons, and argues for social purposes to direct technological change. The demand concerns who can shape the research agenda, rather than merely who receives its completed products. [7]
There is an important difficulty here. Naming a social constituency does not specify how its representatives will remain accountable, how disagreements will be settled or how research quality will be protected. A union can represent some workers while precarious workers remain outside it. A community representative can speak without a dependable mandate. Public governance therefore needs routes for contesting representation, access to comprehensible evidence, and reasons for decisions that others can challenge. The democratic content lies in those arrangements as well as in the names around a table.
A public capacity that can endure
Consider how these distinctions would change the assessment of a proposed municipal technology project. Its service promise would still require independent technical scrutiny. Alongside that assessment, its public case should specify what skills remain locally, what maintenance can be performed without the supplier, and how residents and workers can alter priorities. The budget should recognise the continuing costs of learning and repair. An impressive opening demonstration cannot answer questions about a service’s life after the initial funding ends.
The strongest objection is practical: extensive participation and domestic learning can increase costs, delay urgent provision or protect an inefficient local supplier. Those risks require comparison, not dismissal. A cheaper imported system may be the responsible immediate choice. But its evaluation should include future dependence and the cost of losing alternatives. Equally, a local supplier should have to demonstrate useful learning and reliable performance. Developmental claims must not become a shelter from scrutiny.
For African cooperation, the same reasoning points towards shared capacities that no single institution could sustain alone, while preserving each participant’s ability to learn and decide. The alternative to dependency need not be technological isolation. It can be a more equal division of research, production and authority, with transparent obligations and benefits.
Maharajh’s work brings a difficult obligation into the discussion of progress: to account for the social order that technical achievement serves. A public investment earns a stronger developmental claim when it leaves people able to maintain a service, understand its choices and contest its direction. That standard connects scientific competence to democratic power. It asks of innovation something more durable than novelty: an enlargement of society’s capacity to govern its own future.
Sources and further reading
- Rasigan Maharajh, Innovating beyond Racial Capitalism (2011) (opens in a new tab) Lund doctoral thesis. See the research questions, historical method and concluding discussion of the innovation framework.
- Tshwane University of Technology, 2026 symposium announcement and academic identification (opens in a new tab) University symposium announcement identifying Maharajh’s professorial role and Academy membership in 2026.
- African Scientists Directory, Rasigan Maharajh profile (opens in a new tab) Biographical account of Maharajh’s research, institutional work and earlier career.
- Lund University, doctoral publication and defence record (opens in a new tab) University bibliographical record of the 2011 doctoral thesis and defence.
- Rasigan Maharajh and Erika Kraemer-Mbula, Innovation Strategies in Developing Countries (2010) (opens in a new tab) OECD/IDRC, Innovation and the Development Agenda, chapter 7. See learning, assimilation and policy experimentation.
- Department of Science and Technology, White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation (2019) (opens in a new tab) Historical policy assessment and stated objectives, including the 1996–2016 review and sections on local and grassroots innovation.
- Rasigan Maharajh, Ecological challenges for systems of innovation analysis in Africa (2025) (opens in a new tab) AOSIS Books, chapter 6, pp. 97–105. DOI: 10.4102/aosis.2025.BK548.06.
