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Ideas & History · Land, women and collective production

Bina Agarwal: who gains power when women farm together?

Women’s collective farms in Kerala and Telangana produced different economic results. Read alongside Bina Agarwal’s theory of bargaining, the comparison asks whether cooperation changes power as well as production.

Bina Agarwal's 2018 study found sharply different results for women's group farms in two Indian states. In Kerala, the groups achieved higher annual output value per hectare and higher annual net returns per farm than the predominantly male-managed individual farms studied. In Telangana, group farms had lower annual output but comparable net returns. The contrast is the finding worth examining. [1]

A collective can be asked to carry two promises at once: produce more and redistribute power. Neither achievement automatically establishes the other. A farm may become more profitable while its members remain dependent on someone else’s permission to work, use land or spend their earnings. Conversely, a new capacity to make decisions can matter even before it produces a large financial return. A serious assessment needs to hold these possibilities together.

What the comparison can establish

The women leased land and cultivated together, sharing labour, input costs and returns. Agarwal compared groups with small individual family farms in the same state using primary sample surveys. Her conclusion was conditional: group farming could provide a viable alternative, with support and adaptation to local circumstances. [1]

Her 2019 study of empowerment describes the underlying fieldwork: weekly records of inputs and outputs over a farming year, supplemented by focus groups and interviews. Comparison farms were sampled rather than assigned to an intervention. In Kerala, they were the group members’ family farms, mostly managed by husbands or sons. In Telangana, comparison farms included both members’ family farms and farms unconnected to the groups. [4]

This design permits a detailed comparison of working institutions. It does not isolate the effect of cooperation as if the same farmers had been randomly assigned to otherwise identical arrangements. Land, skills, support and the circumstances of joining can influence the result. That limitation does not make the comparison worthless. It changes the claim it can sustain: these arrangements produced these outcomes under these conditions. A programme seeking similar results must investigate the conditions instead of treating collective organisation as a treatment with a fixed effect.

In her 2020 paper Labouring for Livelihoods, Agarwal examined the differences further. Kerala's groups received continuing state support, training and access to subsidised credit. Group organisation, crop choices, irrigation and local ecology also mattered. Telangana's support was more limited. The comparison directs attention to the institutions surrounding the farm, rather than treating cooperation itself as a sufficient explanation. [5]

A common objection is that success supported by the state cannot demonstrate the strength of cooperation. That objection assumes the very separation the comparison makes doubtful. Credit and training are part of the conditions under which a farm operates. The relevant questions are whether support reaches its intended users, what it costs, how long it is needed and what alternatives would achieve. A fair comparison must make those terms explicit. It should neither conceal a subsidy nor disqualify an institution simply because public resources help it work.

Returns to the farm, control for the worker

There is a crucial measurement qualification. The net returns discussed in Labouring for Livelihoods deduct paid-out costs from output value. That is not the same as assigning a full wage cost to every hour members contribute. A prospective cooperative should therefore examine returns alongside the labour required and what each member actually receives. [5]

Consider the difference between a farm’s annual surplus and a member’s livelihood. A larger surplus could be divided among more people, require more hours or arrive after a long period without income. Those possibilities do not refute the reported result. They identify questions that the result leaves open. An account intended to justify public support should show the distribution of returns, the time contributed and the risks members absorb. Otherwise the unpaid capacity to endure hardship can appear in the accounts as economic efficiency.

The 2019 paper also assessed social empowerment through women’s own accounts in focus groups. Participants described greater recognition within families and communities, and the study linked farm management to contact with public institutions. Agarwal explicitly considered the difficulty of separating benefits of farming from those of joining an organised women’s group. These accounts illuminate perceived changes; they do not independently identify the size of a causal effect. [4]

Taking that evidence seriously requires more than either celebrating it or dismissing it as subjective. Recognition is partly a relationship experienced by the person concerned, so her account is indispensable. Yet confidence, authority and security can move at different speeds. A member may feel respected while lacking a reliable claim on next year’s land or the group’s savings. An evaluation should therefore ask what she can now do, what resources she can command and what happens if someone contests her decision.

The household is not a single interest

Agarwal’s 1997 paper on bargaining explains why household prosperity is an inadequate endpoint. It challenges approaches that treat family members as sharing one set of preferences. Bargaining power depends on more than income: assets, employment, common resources, external support, social norms and perceptions of need all matter. The ability to survive outside a relationship can affect the terms on which a person remains within it. [6]

The paper also makes power dynamic. Securing land may require bargaining, while the land secured can strengthen later negotiations. Norms help determine which claims are legitimate, but norms themselves can be contested. Participation in a decision gives only a partial indication of power; whose interests prevail in the resulting distribution matters more. [6]

This is a demanding way to assess a women’s collective. Attendance at meetings is useful evidence about access, but it cannot establish who decides. An organisation could consult everyone and repeatedly resolve disputes in favour of those with more money, time or influential connections. The appropriate evidence lies partly in difficult cases: whose request changes the work schedule, whose unpaid contribution is recognised and whose objection can stop an unaffordable commitment. Routine consensus tells us less when the costs of disagreement have never been tested.

The same reasoning changes how we understand an increase in household income. Money may enter a household without remaining under the control of the person who earned it. A member’s practical claim on the proceeds, and her ability to challenge their use, therefore belong within the assessment. This does not require imagining a family as a permanent battlefield. It requires refusing to make affection or cooperation stand in for evidence that each person’s interests can be heard and defended.

Collective cultivation and independent rights

The leasing arrangement introduces a further distinction. Cultivating land together does not itself transfer ownership. A collective may gain room to act while remaining exposed to decisions about the renewal or price of a lease. Its members may also possess different rights outside the group. This means that collective production and independent rights to resources answer different questions. One concerns how people organise work; the other concerns what they can claim when an arrangement breaks down. A programme can strengthen one while leaving the other insecure.

There is a serious internal objection too. A collective must coordinate work, yet a rule that rewards every hour identically may disadvantage a member who carries more unpaid care. A rule that ignores contribution altogether can impose a different unfairness on those doing more of the farm work. Neither difficulty is solved by calling the members a community. They need a defensible agreement about contribution, need and shared risk, with room to revise it. These are choices about justice within production, not administrative details to settle after the productive model has been approved.

An exit rule belongs in that agreement. Leaving a group need not mean withdrawing support for collective farming. A person may become ill, acquire care responsibilities or disagree with a major decision. The treatment of her accumulated contribution reveals whether membership creates an enforceable claim or merely a conditional favour. A collective that cannot explain what happens in such a case leaves its least secure members dependent on discretionary goodwill. Durable solidarity needs procedures through which a dispute can be resolved without destroying a livelihood.

What a public commitment should promise

For South African debates, these studies offer a way to examine a proposal, not evidence that an Indian arrangement will work unchanged. The evaluation must connect the productive plan to the distribution of rights: access to land, authority over expenditure, the treatment of labour and the ability to seek redress. These relationships should be designed together. Adding a women’s participation target to an unchanged structure of control cannot establish that the people doing the work will gain the power to direct it.

Agarwal’s research gives cooperation a more serious defence than a promise that unity always pays. It makes the conditions of success visible and distinguishes a productive enterprise from an emancipatory one. The strongest public case for collective farming is that people can gain both a viable livelihood and a stronger claim over the decisions shaping it. Each part of that promise needs evidence, and neither should disappear when the other produces an attractive result.

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Sources and further reading
  1. Bina Agarwal, Can Group Farms Outperform Individual Family Farms? Empirical Insights from India (opens in a new tab) World Development 108 (2018), pp. 57–73.
  2. International Balzan Foundation, Bina Agarwal: 2017 Gender Studies laureate (opens in a new tab) Biographical chronology and historical award.
  3. University of Manchester, Bina Agarwal research profile (opens in a new tab) Current Global Development Institute affiliation.
  4. Bina Agarwal, Does group farming empower rural women? Lessons from India’s experiments (opens in a new tab) Published online 31 July 2019 in The Journal of Peasant Studies.
  5. Bina Agarwal, Labouring for Livelihoods: Gender, Productivity and Collectivity (opens in a new tab) The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 63 (2020), pp. 21–37.
  6. Bina Agarwal, “Bargaining” and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household (opens in a new tab) Feminist Economics 3 (1997), pp. 1–51.

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