Ideas & History · Commons and democratic institutions
Elinor Ostrom: who can govern the commons?
People can make credible rules for shared resources. The harder questions are which arrangements sustain cooperation, who gets a voice and when a successful community still excludes its neighbours.
A shared resource creates two problems that can easily be confused. People need to limit uses that undermine it, and they need legitimate ways to decide who must accept those limits. A forest can survive under an unjust regime; an inclusive meeting can agree to rules that fail ecologically. Elinor Ostrom’s work makes self-government a serious possibility. Reading it carefully also prevents the word community from settling questions that institutions still have to answer.
A resource is not a property regime
In her 2009 Nobel lecture, Ostrom distinguished common-pool resources by two features: one person’s use can reduce what remains available to others, and excluding potential users can be difficult. Those characteristics describe a problem of use. They do not dictate a single form of ownership or government. [3]
This distinction blocks a familiar shortcut. Calling a fishery or groundwater basin a commons does not tell us whether access is unrestricted, whether a defined group has enforceable rights, or whether a public authority controls entry. To compare institutions, we must first establish what people are actually permitted to do. Otherwise failure under one arrangement can be used to condemn every form of collective ownership. The same error works in reverse when a successful association is offered as proof that public administration has no useful role.
The capacity to govern includes the capacity to refuse a damaging use. That creates a tension inside emancipatory claims about ownership. Restrictions may protect the livelihood on which people depend, yet those restrictions can also be designed to protect insiders against poorer claimants. Their legitimacy therefore depends on the grounds for membership, the distribution of burdens and the possibility of challenging a decision. A sign announcing community ownership cannot tell us whether these relationships are democratic.
What happened when people could talk
Ostrom, James Walker and Roy Gardner tested these questions through laboratory experiments reported in Covenants with and without a Sword. Groups of eight university students allocated tokens between a fixed-return option and a shared activity whose returns depended on total investment. Excessive collective investment reduced the group’s returns. The researchers varied opportunities to communicate and to impose costly penalties on one another. [4]
Communication improved outcomes, with repeated opportunities generally working better than a single discussion. Agreements could nevertheless break down. Sanctioning introduced another difficulty: punishment had costs, and some penalties appeared to be mistakes or retaliation. The researchers therefore examined communication and sanctions together, treating enforcement as an institution whose design and costs required investigation. They did not infer that giving people a power to punish would automatically create effective cooperation. [4]
The volunteers and controlled payoff structure sharply limit generalisation. These experiments were not trials of complete governments or of inherited village institutions. Their value was to test particular claims about commitments, communication and enforcement under specified conditions. [4]
This changes the meaning of trust. If cooperation depended only on finding virtuous people, institutional design would have little to contribute. A more useful question is what makes a promise credible to someone who cannot inspect another person’s intentions. A person may accept a restriction when there is a workable way to question breaches and revise an unfair obligation. Conversely, demanding trust while denying people any means of redress asks the vulnerable to supply confidence that the institution has not earned.
Nor is discipline the opposite of participation. A democratically adopted restriction can protect members against those able to appropriate more than their share. The political issue is who can initiate a complaint, what evidence is required and whether the same rule applies to influential members. If punishment depends on personal loyalty, an organisation may secure obedience without securing a common interest. The costs of contesting an error are therefore part of the institution’s performance, even when they are absent from a financial account.
From an experiment to an irrigation system
Ostrom’s Nobel lecture also described research on irrigation in Nepal. The project combined existing case studies with field visits to fill missing information and check earlier accounts. Comparisons examined infrastructure condition, water reaching farmers at the end of a system and agricultural productivity. Farmer-managed systems performed better on these measures after accounting for environmental differences; an expanded database contained 229 systems. The findings challenged an automatic preference for government management, without demonstrating that every farmer association would outperform every public agency. [3]
The choice of measures is revealing. A canal’s physical condition matters, but so does the water that reaches someone furthest from its intake. Aggregate production could hide a distributional failure. At the same time, favourable comparisons remain evidence about particular arrangements in particular conditions. They do not give a government permission to transfer responsibilities without resources and call the result empowerment. The relevant question is whether users receive usable authority, reliable support and the capacity to sustain the system they are expected to manage.
A 2010 review by Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold and Sergio Villamayor Tomás examined 91 studies evaluating Ostrom’s design principles. It found substantial support while recognising incomplete data and limits to generalisation. The review separated monitoring users’ conduct from monitoring the resource’s condition. A group can comply with its own extraction rules while the resource continues to deteriorate, so these are distinct tasks. [5]
The review also resisted turning principles into a universal checklist. Its case analysis depended on what earlier studies reported, and missing information prevented a single combined analysis of all principles. It accepted that external economic and political conditions mattered and could not establish the principles’ performance in large systems outside community management. [5]
That is a stronger position than either celebrating local knowledge or dismissing it as parochial. An institution must be capable of learning when familiar practices cease to work. Compliance records answer whether people followed a rule; ecological observations help answer whether the rule remains adequate. The second can force an uncomfortable revision of the first. Self-government becomes durable when members can organise that revision without treating every challenge as an attack on the community itself.
The people missing from participation
Bina Agarwal’s 2001 study supplies a necessary challenge to any celebratory account. Drawing on visits and interviews at 87 community-forestry sites in India and Nepal, alongside existing studies, she examined women’s exclusion within ostensibly participatory institutions. Membership rules, norms about speaking in meetings, perceptions of women’s capacities and unequal resources shaped effective participation. Formal presence could fall far short of influence over decisions. [6]
Her framework distinguished participation as membership, information, consultation, specific work, active involvement and influence. It also treated women’s capacity to alter constraints as connected to bargaining within the family, community and state. The study’s qualitative evidence identified processes of exclusion; it was not a randomised estimate of what a single institutional reform would achieve everywhere. [6]
This critique does not make the possibility of self-government disappear. It changes the identity of the self that is supposedly governing. A household representative cannot simply be assumed to express every household member’s interests. Nor can an executive committee’s agreement stand in for the consent of those whose labour maintains the resource. An association that protects a forest while intensifying unpaid work for excluded members requires criticism on both democratic and distributional grounds, even if its conservation record is strong.
Local authority, wider obligations
A serious objection remains: fragmented authorities may struggle with problems crossing their boundaries, or allow powerful local actors to entrench themselves. Those possibilities require public coordination, rights of appeal and protection against exclusion. They do not establish that every operational decision should be centralised. Conversely, evidence that users can govern a resource does not absolve a state from financing infrastructure, addressing dispossession or enforcing equal rights. The division of authority must be justified by the problem and made revisable when it fails.
For South African debates over land, water and collective production, Ostrom’s contribution is therefore demanding. Shared ownership must come with powers people can exercise, duties they can understand and decisions they can challenge. Ecological survival, economic viability and democratic inclusion each need evidence. The most serious defence of the commons accepts that these aims can come into conflict and builds institutions capable of confronting the conflict, including the interests that the governing group would prefer not to hear.
Sources and further reading
- Indiana University Ostrom Workshop, Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (opens in a new tab) Life dates, book and historical award status.
- Indiana University, Elinor Ostrom career record (opens in a new tab) Academic appointments and institutional roles.
- Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (opens in a new tab) Prize lecture, 8 December 2009; later published in American Economic Review.
- Elinor Ostrom, James Walker and Roy Gardner, Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible (opens in a new tab) American Political Science Review 86 (1992), pp. 404–417.
- Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold and Sergio Villamayor Tomás, A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management (opens in a new tab) Ecology and Society 15 (2010), article 38.
- Bina Agarwal, Participatory Exclusions, Community Forestry, and Gender (opens in a new tab) World Development 29 (2001), pp. 1623–1648.
