Ideas & History · Extraction, divestment and ecological repair
Nnimmo Bassey: when an oil company leaves, who must repair the land?
The Niger Delta exposes a difficult distinction between selling an oil business, ending extraction and repairing its damage. Reading Bassey alongside environmental assessments and a landmark court decision makes that distinction concrete.
On 13 March 2025, Shell announced that it had completed the sale of its Nigerian onshore subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development Company, to Renaissance. The company described a shift towards deepwater production and integrated gas. Renaissance took control of SPDC’s 30% interest in the joint venture. The announcement recorded a change in ownership and investment strategy. It did not announce the end of oil production in the Niger Delta. [1]
Nnimmo Bassey’s response to this wider pattern of divestment is a demand about obligations. In an address to journalists in May 2026, published as Ecological Time Bombs in the Niger Delta, he called for environmental and health audits, removal of derelict infrastructure, restoration and reparations. Responsibility, in his argument, should remain with those who caused the injury. Selling an interest in an oil business must not become a means of leaving communities with its accumulated damage. [2]
There are three different events here: a company exits an investment, an economy reduces its dependence on fossil fuels, and a damaged place becomes safe to inhabit and work in. Their separation is the core of the problem. A transaction can be completed on a particular day. Repair involves people who may have to live with the consequences for years. An energy transition judged only through corporate portfolios can lose sight of that difference.
A change of owner is not a change of relationship
The political force of Bassey’s position lies in who gets to define an ending. For an investor, an exit concerns an asset and future returns. For residents, an ending would require a different relationship to their water, land and means of earning a living. A sale may rearrange the first relationship while leaving the second untouched. The term transition becomes misleading when these distinct outcomes are allowed to stand in for one another.
HOMEF’s account of a March 2022 discussion about oil-company divestments records Bassey criticising development decisions made without meaningful community consent. Projects, he argued, were often imposed without reflecting local priorities. The meeting connected divestment to the restoration of livelihoods and the environment. Its concern was therefore wider than who would receive the next stream of oil income: it included the authority to decide what development should mean. [5]
This is a stronger challenge than asking for a larger share of a damaging arrangement. A community can receive a payment while losing control over the conditions that make life possible. Conversely, transferring a business to a domestically based owner does not itself establish public control. The nationality of a shareholder cannot tell us whether residents can reject a proposal, obtain information or force remedial action. Those powers must be created and exercised through institutions.
The distinction also changes how we understand a subsidy. If the price of an asset reflects its expected income while the public later absorbs an unfunded clean-up, private profitability has depended on shifting part of the cost elsewhere. That is an analytical test, not proof that every sale follows this pattern. Establishing it requires the transaction’s obligations, environmental baseline and funding arrangements to be examined together. A patriotic account of new ownership is no substitute for that evidence.
Repair has a sequence and a duration
UNEP’s 2011 assessment of Ogoniland supplies a physical basis for taking those obligations seriously. Its investigation analysed more than 4,000 samples. At Nisisioken Ogale, well water contained benzene at over 900 times the World Health Organization guideline. These are findings from that assessment, not measurements of present conditions. UNEP estimated that environmental restoration could take 25 to 30 years and proposed an initial US$1 billion restoration fund. [6]
The report explained why a clean-up cannot be judged by appearances. Contaminated land could continue polluting creeks, so treating the creeks first would be futile. It called for ongoing sources of contamination, including artisanal refining, to be stopped. Ten of 15 sites recorded by SPDC as remediated still exceeded closure thresholds. The problem involved the movement of pollutants and the standards used to declare the work finished. [6]
For public accountability, that suggests separating money spent, work performed and conditions restored. A contractor can complete an assigned operation without a household obtaining safe water. An agency can disburse its budget while leaving a source of contamination active. Each measure answers a different question. Public reporting needs to connect them, allowing affected people to challenge a completion certificate when the condition it supposedly guarantees has not been achieved.
There has also been institutional work since the original assessment. A May 2025 evaluation examined UNEP’s 2018–2023 project supporting Nigeria’s Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project, HYPREP. Drawing on documents, interviews and a November 2024 field mission, the evaluators rated the support project satisfactory overall. They found that it strengthened technical and managerial capacity. They also identified uncertainty over the finance needed to finish remediation and rated sustainability moderately likely. The object assessed was UNEP’s support project, not a certification that every polluted site had been restored. [7]
This complicates an account in which institutions either do nothing or solve everything. Capacity can improve while the financing of a long task remains insecure. The constructive demand is to protect gains while making their continuation enforceable. A restoration fund should be judged through the obligations it can actually finance, the independence of its oversight and the ability of residents to contest its priorities, rather than through the size of its launch announcement.
Responsibility across a corporate border
The 2021 UK Supreme Court decision in Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell addressed a different obstacle. Nigerian claimants argued that the parent company owed them a duty of care concerning its subsidiary’s operations. The Court held that there was a real issue to be tried. It distinguished share ownership from involvement in managing the relevant activity and stressed the potential importance of internal documents. This was a jurisdictional decision allowing the claim past that threshold, not a final finding that the defendants had caused all the alleged harm. [8]
The decision helps identify an accountability problem without supplying a universal answer. Those experiencing damage may lack the records needed to establish how distant corporate decisions shaped local operations. Access to evidence can therefore be part of the struggle over responsibility. Litigation can open that route, but winning permission to argue a case is different from obtaining repair. A democratic regulatory system should not make every household reconstruct the organisation of a multinational before securing basic protection. [8]
The livelihood objection must change the transition
The strongest objection to Bassey’s position is material. Workers need incomes, governments need revenue and households need affordable energy. Insisting on repair while offering no credible future for those livelihoods can turn an ecological demand into another threat. Nor does identifying corporate responsibility automatically establish how much each actor must pay, which institution can enforce payment or what happens if the available funds are inadequate. Those questions require evidence, bargaining and public decisions.
They do not justify postponing every obligation until an ideal alternative economy exists. Immediate protection, long-term restoration and replacement livelihoods can be financed as connected commitments with different timetables. Workers should be able to negotiate training, income protection and future employment; residents should be able to influence restoration priorities. Repair work must itself provide decent conditions. It would reproduce the old relation if the people harmed were then employed precariously to remove the damage.
There is a further tension within the language of community. Households dependent on fishing, employees of an oil business and local contractors may favour different priorities. A single spokesperson or consultation meeting cannot dissolve those differences. Durable public control requires ways to disclose interests, contest representation and revisit decisions. The aim is to strengthen people’s capacity to govern a difficult transition, not to imagine that a unified local will already exists.
Bassey’s challenge becomes most useful when it makes the word development carry obligations through time. Reducing future harm and repairing inherited harm belong in the same political settlement. The institutions that authorise a transfer of assets must also make visible who remains answerable for the land, water and livelihoods around them. The decisive measure is whether people can secure that answer after the sale is complete and the departing company has stopped calling the place its business.
Sources and further reading
- Shell, completion of the sale of SPDC (opens in a new tab) Company announcement, 13 March 2025. The ownership transaction and Shell’s stated investment strategy.
- Nnimmo Bassey, Ecological Time Bombs in the Niger Delta (opens in a new tab) Address to the Nigerian Union of Journalists, Rivers State Council, 18 May 2026; published 14 June 2026.
- Right Livelihood, Nnimmo Bassey (opens in a new tab) Institutional biography, education and 2010 award record.
- Nnimmo Bassey, About (opens in a new tab) Author’s biographical record, including current HOMEF role and dated previous offices.
- HOMEF, The PIA and Oil Company Divestments: A Time to Act (opens in a new tab) Firsthand account of HOMEF and We the People’s March 2022 discussion in Port Harcourt.
- UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland: Executive Summary (opens in a new tab) 2011 executive summary, especially pp. 1–2, 4–6 and 8–9. Findings describe the original assessment period.
- UNEP Evaluation Office, terminal evaluation of the 2018–2023 HYPREP support project (opens in a new tab) May 2025 evaluation. Scope: UNEP’s technical support to HYPREP during 2018–2023; field mission November 2024.
- UK Supreme Court, Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell, [2021] UKSC 3 (opens in a new tab) Judgment of 12 February 2021. See the distinction between an arguable duty-of-care claim and a final finding of liability.
